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 The eagle has crash-landed 
Despite an unprecedented media campaign, Prabowo Subianto’s political
fallen flat – for now 
 
Dirk Tomsa 
Ten years ago it seeme
Subianto’s political care
had really begun. During
New Order, the former c
notorious special forces
a power struggle agains
and was subsequently d
military. Accused of invo
abduction of student act
instigation of the anti-Ch
May 1998, the former so
president Suharto consi
the country and go into 
self-imposed exile in Jo
attention to business, m
international oil and gas
number of high-stake de
billionaire brother, busin
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In the meantime, Prabo
days in the army, Wiranto, enjoyed a brief moment in the sun. Having outmaneuvered
turbulent days of the transition, the former adjutant of Suharto was instrumental in he
Wahid to an unexpected stint at the presidency in 1999. But to Wiranto’s disappointm
Wahid did not bring the desired recompense. Instead of being rewarded with the vice
make do with a ministerial post. Shortly afterwards, Wahid added insult to injury when
from the cabinet. Thus, merely two years after the fall of Suharto it seemed, for a sho
there was no place for either Wiranto or Prabowo in Indonesia’s new democracy.  
Two years after the fall of Suharto it seemed there was no place fo
or Prabowo in Indonesia’s new democracy 
    ‘Beware! Killers surround us! We remember those who were  
    abducted and killed. We do not forget, we do not forgive.’  
    An image popular among Indonesian users of Facebook 
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It did not take long for the two to attempt political comebacks. In 2004, Wiranto and P
candidates in Golkar’s national convention to select a presidential candidate. Wiranto
huge amounts of money at the convention in order to secure a place in Indonesia’s fir
presidential election. In the end the former commander-in-chief of the armed forces d
convention, but he failed to make it all the way to the palace, finishing third in the pres
Undeterred by the defeat, Wiranto then moved on to found his own party (Hanura) an
for the next elections in 2009.  
His old foe Prabowo, meanwhile, was not just sitting idly by. In fact, it seemed as if de
convention had only whetted his appetite for politics. Watching Wiranto’s activities ca
began to get ready for the next elections. In contrast to his half-hearted campaign in 2
he meant business. Assisted by a high-profile media consultancy firm from the United
crafted an elaborate strategy which he hoped would eventually elevate him to the hig
consisted of three main pillars: first, mobilisation of support for his bid; second, enhan
for his organisational vehicle; and third, finding a niche in the political spectrum that h
distinguish himself from other candidates.  
Finding the right vehicle 
Prabowo’s first step was to assume control over one of Indonesia’s biggest mass orga
farmers’ association HKTI (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia). Created during the
corporatist tool for Suharto to monitor Indonesia’s millions of peasants, this organisati
political oblivion after 1998, but its vague affiliation with the rural masses made it an id
Prabowo because it provided him with an opportunity to begin his image-building cam
himself as a champion of the poor. In December 2004 he was elected HKTI chairman
votes – never mind that he was not even a member of the association at that time.  
The HKTI position provided Prabowo with valuable access to an organisational base,
2009 elections he needed more than the chairmanship of a mass organisation. Indon
dictate that only candidates who are nominated by political parties are allowed to con
election, so in order to avoid dependence on the goodwill of an already existing party
what various other retired generals had done before him: he created a new party of h
(Movement for a Great Indonesia) was born, a party with a fierce-looking Garuda eag
Garuda is the centrepiece of Indonesia’s national coat of arms). From the day of its fo
2008, Gerindra dedicated itself almost exclusively to promoting the presidential ambit
Subianto.  
At first sight, Gerindra appeared to be not much different from the various other partie
established by retired generals in recent years. Just like Edi Sudradjat’s PKPI, Harton
recently Wiranto’s Hanura, Gerindra too seemed to stand for little more than conserva
imbued with a touch of New Order nostalgia. And yet, many observers were much mo
Gerindra than the other parties formed by retired officers. A closer look at the compos
board and its advisory council reveals why. Formally led by a largely unknown forestr
Suhardi, Gerindra provides a political home for a number of controversial former gene
dogged by persistent allegations of gross human rights violations. Amongst the most 
Kairupan, a former intelligence officer with a dubious track record in East Timor, Much
despite his exoneration by a Jakarta court is widely believed to have masterminded th
rights activist Munir in September 2004, and of course Prabowo himself, whose list of
includes abduction, torture, and instigation of large-scale anti-Chinese riots. For this r
Prabowo caused particular alarm among human rights advocates, many of whom pro
his presidential campaign this year.  
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In order to dispel this image, Prabowo pursued an ingenious plan. To the disbelief of 
activists who now opposed his candidature, Prabowo approached some of his former
them to join his party. Why exactly former student activists like Desmond Mahesa or P
Haryanto Taslam, a former leader of Megawati Soekarnoputri’s PDI-P, all three of wh
Prabowo’s troops in 1998, agreed to support the presidential ambitions of their forme
the subject of much speculation. Some observers have argued that they were simply 
claim they may suffer from Stockholm syndrome (a psychological condition in which v
become emotionally attached to their hostage-taker). The three men themselves have
speculation and simply maintained that after Prabowo had apologised to them, it was
An unprecedented media campaign 
For Prabowo, people like Haryano, Desmond and Pius represented important human
used in his bid for the presidency. But the real weapon in Prabowo Subianto’s struggl
was an unprecedented media offensive which in mid-2008 ushered in the second pha
campaign. While other parties were still in the planning stage, Prabowo began to inun
public with an unparalleled bombardment of political advertisements.  
Buoyed by a self-confidence bordering on hubris, Prabow
advertisements to liken himself to statesmen ranging from Napole
to Barack Obama 
Buoyed by a self-confidence bordering on hubris, Prabowo used these advertisement
array of past and present statesmen, ranging from Napoleon and Sukarno to Barack 
advertisements featured the majestic Garuda eagle and consistently highlighted the a
Suharto administrations to realise Indonesia’s huge economic potential. To fund this m
soldier-cum-businessman-cum-politician had to dig deep into his pockets (and those o
According to a Gerindra official, the media campaign alone cost about US$100 million
for speculation about just how much more was spent on other campaign activities.  
Throughout his media offensive, Prabowo portrayed himself as the only presidential c
liberating Indonesia from the yoke of rural poverty, unemployment and foreign debt. S
What very few observers had predicted, however, was the solution Prabowo propose
alleged malaise. Driven by the need to distinguish himself from his rivals, the man wh
largely to strategic maneuvers on global financial markets and to his connections to s
most powerful elite families campaigned on a quasi-socialist platform, criticising the g
privatisation agenda and proposing revisions of existing contracts with foreign compa
and Exxon. Given Prabowo’s background, this may sound cynical, but the ‘anti-neolib
to stand out from his rivals. And in view of the electoral success of other big-spending
Hugo Chavez or perhaps Thaksin Shinawatra the strategy made sense, especially in 
financial crisis.  
Was it all in vain? 
So why did it not work? Even though Prabowo had implemented his campaign strateg
start, Gerindra got less than five per cent of the vote (Wiranto’s Hanura party fared ev
only about three per cent). A number of reasons probably account for this poor result,
discomfort amongst many Indonesians about Prabowo’s hardline image and his huma
as widespread apprehension about his links to the Suharto family. Taken together, th
provided a substantial deterrent for many voters. Arguably the most important reason
despite the global financial crisis the overall socio-economic conditions in Indonesia w
the emergence of a populist saviour.  
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The man who owed his fortune to strategic global financia
connections to some of Indonesia’s most powerful elite families c
quasi-socialist platform 
Thanks largely to the government’s three-phase ‘direct cash assistance’ (BLT) progra
Indonesians appear to be quite satisfied with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s
Significantly, the third phase of the BLT program was implemented in late March 2009
merely two weeks before the election more than 18 million poor families received yet 
sponsored cash injection of Rp 100,000 per month, to be distributed over a period of 
these measures taken by the incumbent president, it is hardly surprising that few of th
and fisherfolk targeted by Prabowo saw a need for a radical overhaul of the economic
even those who may actually have seen this need were apparently reluctant to believ
implement it would be, of all people, Prabowo Subianto, who, to put it lightly, is hardly
philanthropy.  
Another important reason for Prabowo’s failure to push Gerindra to a better result was
essentially regressive. Despite the professional outlook of the advertisements, Gerind
preoccupied primarily with romanticising the past rather than outlining the future. This
epitomised in a statement by Gerindra’s deputy chairman Fadli Zon who maintained t
to rebuild Indonesia just like how it was in the past when people gained prosperity fro
fishing’. Clearly, the election result showed that very few Indonesians share this desir
Thus, it could be argued that Prabowo may have revolutionised the style of political a
but he failed to match his impressive style with a convincing message.  
So Prabowo will not become Indonesia’s next president, and neither will Wiranto. Doe
long last there really is no place for these two in Indonesia’s democracy? Not quite. D
at the ballot box and poor approval ratings in most opinion polls, both Prabowo and W
vice-presidential candidates for Megawati and Jusuf Kalla respectively. This may look
only, but it will ensure that the two will continue to have a place in the system for year
surprised if they run for president again in 2014.     ii  
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